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EXCLUSIONARY BUNDLED DISCOUNTS AND
THE ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION
Erik Hovenkamp 1
Herbert Hovenkamp 2

ABSTRACT
A bundled discount occurs when a seller charges less for a
bundle of goods than for its components when sold separately. A
characteristic of such discounting is that a rival who makes only one
of the products in the bundle may have to give a larger per item
discount in order to compensate the buyer for the foregone discount
on goods that the rival does not sell. For example, if I sell A and B
and offer a 20% discount only to customers who purchase one A and
one B together, a rival in the B market might be able to match the
discounted B price. But the rival must also compensate the customer
for the loss of discount on A, given that the customer would still have
to purchase A from the dominant firm at the undiscounted price. As
a result, a rival who is equally efficient in other respects but who
makes only product B may not be able to match the discount. The
final Report of the Antitrust Modernization Commission (AMC)
proposed a three part test for the illegality of a monopolist’s bundling
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act: (1) after allocating all discounts
and rebates attributable to the entire bundle of products to the
competitive product, the defendant sold the competitive product
below its incremental cost for the competitive product; (2) the
defendant is likely to recoup these short-term losses; and; (3) the
bundled discount or rebate program has had or is likely to have an
adverse effect on competition. We argue that the first of these three
tests must be restated in order to take into account important
possibilities, such as economies of scope; even so it is seriously
overdeterrent particularly when bundling is used to facilitate price
discrimination, where the secondary market is competitive, or where
bundling is used to disguise price cuts in oligopolistic or cartelized
markets. We also argue that the AMC’s “recoupment” test is not
1
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helpful in most circumstances, but that its requirement of a separate
showing of an adverse impact on competition is essential.

EXCLUSIONARY BUNDLED DISCOUNTS AND
THE ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION
I. Introduction: Bundled Discounts and the AMC Test
A bundled discount occurs when a seller charges less for a
bundle of goods than for its components when they are sold
separately. A characteristic of such discounting is that a rival who
makes only one of the products in the bundle (or a smaller subset of
products than the dominant firm offers) may have to give a larger per
item discount in order to compensate the buyer for the foregone
discount on goods that the rival does not sell. For example, if I sell A
and B and offer a 20% discount only to customers who purchase one
A and one B together, a rival in the B market might be able to match
the discounted B price. But the rival would also have to compensate
the customer for the loss of discount on A, given that the customer
would still have to purchase A from the dominant firm at the
undiscounted price. As a result, a rival who is equally efficient in
other respects but who makes only product B may not be able to
match the discount.
So-called "mixed" bundling occurs when a firm sells at least one
of the goods in the bundle separately, but also offers them at a
discounted price if they are purchased as a bundle. "Pure" bundling,
by contrast, occurs when a firm sells goods only in bundles. 3
The final Report of the Antitrust Modernization Commission
(AMC) proposed the following test for unilaterally imposed mixed
bundling when challenged as an exclusionary practice:
Courts should adopt a three-part test to determine whether
bundled discounts or rebates violate Section 2 of the Sherman
Act. To prove a violation of Section 2, a plaintiff should be
3. See, e.g., David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, Why Do Firms Bundle
and Tie? Evidence from Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying Law,
22 YALE J. ON REG. 37, 54 (2005); Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit
Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare, 55 EMORY L.J. 423 (2006).
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required to show each one of the following elements (as well
as other elements of a Section 2 claim):
(1) after allocating all discounts and rebates attributable
to the entire bundle of products to the competitive
product, the defendant sold the competitive product
below its incremental cost for the competitive product;
(2) the defendant is likely to recoup these short-term
losses; and
(3) the bundled discount or rebate program has had or
is likely to have an adverse effect on competition. 4
As a shorthand we term the three elements of this test (1)
"attribution," (2) "recoupment," and (3) "anticompetitive effects."
Some portions of the AMC test are consistent with many of the
decisions, 5 although largely inconsistent with the Third Circuit's
4. Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendation 99
(April 2007), available in full text at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/.
5. E.g., Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir.
2008) (adopting attribution requirement but rejecting recoupment and
anticompetitive effects requirement except insofar as latter is established
under antitrust injury requirement). See also Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. v.
British Airways PLC, 69 F. Supp. 2d 571, 580 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd on
other grounds, 257 F.3d 256 (2d Cir. 2001), which read that same federal
district court's earlier Ortho decision as requiring the plaintiff to show that "the
competitive product in the bundle" was "sold for a price below average
variable cost after the discounts on the monopoly items in the bundle were
subtracted from the price of that competitive product" (emphasis added),
referring to Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp.
455, 467-470 (S.D.N.Y.1996). See also Information Resources, Inc. (IRI ) v.
Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 359 F. Supp. 2d 307, 307-308 (S.D.N.Y. 2004),
which concluded:
When price discounts in one market are bundled with the price
charged in a second market, the discounts must be applied to the
price in the second market in determining whether that price is below
that product's average variable cost....
The claim in IRI was that the defendant operated in multiple countries and
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important but much criticized LePage's decision. 6
Here we explore each of the three elements of the AMC test. We
generally agree that the first requirement is a sensible safe harbor
but has the potential to sweep far too broadly, particularly if it
becomes a de facto prima facie test of illegality. 7 There are simply
too many competitively benign or procompetitive instances of
bundling that flunk the attribution test. We also observe that the
attribution test as the AMC states it is incorrect in the presence of
joint costs, or economies of scope. We generally disagree with the
second element of the test, particularly if "recoupment" is used in its
strict Brooke Group sense, 8 but alternative definitions of recoupment
might be acceptable. We generally agree with the anticompetitive
effects test.
II. The "Attribution" Test for Mixed Bundling
The attribution test is a necessary ("safe harbor") but not a
sufficient condition for unlawful bundled discounts. If a bundle
passes the attribution test, an equally efficient rival who makes only
gave a discount for services delivered in multiple countries, while the plaintiff
operated in only one of them. See Information Resources, Inc. (IRI ) v. Dun &
Bradstreet Corp., 294 F.3d 447, 449 (2d Cir. 2002). By offering its services in
more countries than could its rivals, the defendant constrained them in much
the same way that results from exclusionary multi-product bundling. See 3A
Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &749e (3d ed. 2008).
6. LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert.
denied, 542 U.S. 953 (2004). See also Bradburn Parent/Teacher Store, Inc.
v. 3M, 2003-2 Trade Cas. &74,105 (E.D. Pa. July 25, 2003) (refusing to
dismiss follow-on consumer action alleging that bundled rebates served to
maintain defendant's monopoly in tape market). See generally 3A Phillip E.
Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &749d (3d ed. 2008).
7. Part II.
8. See Part III, and Brooke Group Ltd., v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) (primary-line Robinson-Patman case), confirmed
for Sherman Act '2 cases by Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons
Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1069 (2007) (to the extent it is
relevant, HH was consulted by the defendant).
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one product in the bundle (or a subset) will be able to compete.
However, giving excessive weight to the test results in far too many
false positives. As a result, summary judgment should never be
denied to a defendant merely on the basis that the defendant's
pricing scheme failed the attribution test. Thus we quarrel with
important parts of the Ninth Circuit's approach in the Cascade
decision. 9 Under the Ninth Circuit's formulation a plaintiff who shows
that the defendant's pricing fails the attribution test need not make
any showing of recoupment and, apparently, need not make any
explicit demonstration of anticompetitive effects other than a general
"antitrust injury" showing. 10 Such a rule would lead to extreme
overdeterrence.
The attribution test is frequently stated as it was by the Ninth
Circuit:
To prove that a bundled discount was exclusionary or
predatory for the purposes of a monopolization or attempted
monopolization claim under ' 2 of the Sherman Act, the
plaintiff must establish that, after allocating the discount given
by the defendant on the entire bundle of products to the
competitive product or products, the defendant sold the
competitive product or products below its average variable
cost of producing them. 11
Except for the use of average variable rather than marginal cost,
this is the same thing as asking whether the incremental price of the
bundle over the price of the A product is sufficient to cover the
incremental cost of including the B product in the bundle. That is, it
asks if the marginal or per-unit profitability (price minus cost) of the
bundle exceeds that of A alone. 12 If the answer is yes, then bundling
9. Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir.
2008).
10. See id. at 909-910.
11. Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 910 (9th
Cir. 2008).
12. Because we are considering marginal profit at a specific price level,
we simply assume that marginal profit is equal to that price less the
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in this situation cannot exclude an equally efficient rival. Further,
only this marginal profit approach is accurate in the presence of joint
costs. 13
The Ninth Circuit’s approach also serves to make the test for
exclusionary bundling functionally similar to cost-based tests for
predatory pricing, which refuse to condemn a price cut unless it is
capable of excluding an equally efficient rival. This effectively means
that antitrust law refuses to condemn a defendant's prices unless
they are below an appropriate measure of cost. 14
When a bundle fails the attribution test, the marginal or per-unit
profitability of the bundle falls below that of the individual A good. In
such cases the firm must earn its increased profits from increased
sales of the primary product rather than increased margin. 15 Of
course, an increase in output is presumptively procompetitive and
entails competitive injury only in narrowly defined circumstances.
Alternatively, the bundle might reduce total profits during
some initial bundling period but nevertheless be profitable in the long
run under a recoupment scheme such as the Supreme Court
envisioned in Brooke Group. The defendant would use the bundling
scheme to force a B product rival from the market and then raise its
marginal cost of production. See appendix iii.
13. Joint costs are generally what give rise to economies of scope.
See Ivan Png & Dale Lehman, Managerial Economics 175 (2007).
14. See Brooke Group Ltd., v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209 (1993) (primary-line Robinson-Patman case), confirmed for
Sherman Act '2 cases by Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood
Lumber Co., Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1069 (2007); 3A Areeda and Hovenkamp, note 5
at &&725-727.
A variation of this cost-based rule also applies to market share
discounts and quantity discounts. See, e.g., Concord Boat Corp. v.
Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1062 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 979
(2000) (cost standard for market share discounts); Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT
Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (1st Cir. 1983) (cost standard for quantity
discounts).
15. See appendix ii.
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own B price after that exit occurred. This is generally not possible if
the B market observes constant returns to scale. 16
Whether "exclusion of an equally efficient rival" is the proper
benchmark for a prima facie case of anticompetitive bundled
discounts has been debated numerous times. 17 One might object
that such a rule ignores situations where the dominant firm increases
its own output in order to saturate the market and deprive rivals of
essential scale economies. 18 However, while depriving a rival of
scale will raise its average costs, it need not raise its marginal costs,
which are more helpful in analyzing effects on competition. In any
event, a rule condemning an otherwise rational output increase
because it denies scale economies to a rival places courts in an
untenable position. Measuring the relevant range of scale
economies is usually impossible. Further, the shift of focus to the
rival's scale economies places the defendant in the intolerable
position of having to monitor its rivals' costs. Further, these are
typically not variable cost items whose prices are readily observable
on the market, but rather long term fixed cost investments often
known only to a firm’s own managers. The Ninth Circuit properly
concluded in Cascade that a rule based on the defendant's own
costs, as the orthodox predatory pricing rule is, was necessary to

16. Constant returns to scale prevent a firm from setting artificially high
prices after its rivals are foreclosed. The threat of new entrants acts as a
permanent barrier to monopoly pricing. Thus, consumers are generally not
harmed by exclusionary bundling in these cases. See, e.g., Dennis W.
Carlton and Michael Waldman, "Safe Harbors for Quantity Discounts and
Bundling" (Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper, January 2008,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1089202)
17. For a summary, see 3 Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp,
Antitrust Law &651b2 (3d ed. 2008). See also Daniel A. Crane, Mixed
Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare, 55 Emory L.J. 423 (2006).
18. E.g., See Einer Elhauge, The Exclusion of Competition for Hospital
Sales Through Group Purchasing Organizations, 18 Qune 25, 2002), at
http://umw.law.harvard.ediilfacultylelhaugelpdfl gpo_report-june 02.pdf; and
Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 Stan. L. Rev.
253, 256, 283, 320-323 (2003). See also Einer Elhauge, Loyalty Discounts
and Naked Exclusion (Harvard Law School Discussion Paper #608 (Feb.
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract id=1093749.
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provide clear guidance to dominant firms. 19
While exclusion of an equally efficient rival might not be the
appropriate baseline for assessing all types of allegedly exclusionary
conduct, 20 it is clearly superior for evaluating pricing claims, where
courts are typically in the precarious position of being asked to
condemn a price because it is too low.
Necessary ("Safe Harbor") but not Sufficient Condition
The attribution test does appear to provide a manageable and
rational minimum criterion for illegality and thus creates a "safe
harbor" for bundled pricing that passes the test. But what about
bundles that flunk the attribution test? In Cascade the Ninth Circuit
appeared to assume that any bundled discount that flunks the
attribution test is at least presumptively anticompetitive. 21 First, the
court adopted the AMC's attribution test. 22 Second, it rejected the
recoupment test after observing that single-product predatory pricing
under the Brooke Group standard requires the defendant to lose
money during the predatory period, while even a bundle that flunks
the attribution test can nevertheless be profitable:
[B]ecause discounts on all products in the bundle have been
allocated to the competitive product in issue, a conclusion of
below-cost sales under the discount attribution standard may
occur in some cases even where there is not an actual loss
because the bundle is sold at a price exceeding incremental
cost. In such a case, we do not think it is analytically helpful to
think in terms of recoupment of a loss that did not occur. 23
As a matter of fact, the Ninth Circuit's view about recoupment is
19. See Cascade, note 11, 515 F.3d at 907-918.
20. See 3 Areeda & Hovenkamp, note 17 at &651b4.
21. Cascade, 515 F.3d at 910.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid. See also Barry Nalebuff, Exclusionary Bundling, 50 Antitrust
Bull. 321, 327-330 (2005).
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incorrect. Whether an investment in predation needs to be
"recouped" does not depend on whether the predation required
prices below cost, but on whether it deprived the defendant of short
run profits that it would otherwise have obtained. 24 Any price change
is rational only if it results in higher profits. Those higher profits
might result from higher output at the lower price, provided it is
above cost, or a longer period of market exclusion. Alternatively, if
the standalone price of A is increased the profit might be made
through increased margin.
So while some type of recoupment is always relevant in a case
involving price cutting, the type of recoupment differs depending on
whether or not the price cut is sustainable and whether the strategy
is immediately profitable. Under the Brooke Group rule for predatory
pricing of a single product only a non-sustainable price cut is
recognized as unlawful. Within that paradigm predatory pricing does
in fact require the defendant to lose money during the predation
period, and this loss must necessarily be made up later. 25
Making the attribution test the principal or prima facie determinant
of anticompetitive conduct creates a serious problem of false
positives. Many welfare increasing or competitively harmless
instances of bundling flunk the attribution test. Many of them can be
profitable without regard to whether any rival is excluded. Consider
the following:
1. Secondary good sold in competitive market
When the secondary good is sold in a competitive market, at a
24. Predation is simply a type of investment in which the firm incurs costs
today in the expectation of profits down the road. For example, if GM
constructs a new production facility it reasonably intends to recoup these
costs via increased output in some future time period, whether or not the
construction costs are so high that GM incurs losses during the construction
period.
25. In situations involving bundling, even a strictly exclusionary strategy
will likely observe positive profits immediately, though they may be lower
than those observed before bundling. In such cases it is the relative profit
loss that requires recoupment in the long run.
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price equal to or very close to cost, then virtually any discount fully
attributed to the secondary good will flunk the attribution test. 26 For
example, suppose I possess the manufacturing rights for a
multipurpose cutting tool able to cut various types of materials. It
uses blades intended for an assortment of different materials, all of
which are sold at cost in a highly competitive market for $3 each.
However, it may be the case that my tool is less popular among
carpenters than it is among those who work with other materials.
Thus, to increase my tool’s appeal to carpenters, I decide to offer my
tool with 10 generic wood blades for an additional $15. Because the
total cost of producing these blades is $30, the bundle fails the
attribution test. But my profits increase overall because many more
carpenters now choose to buy my cutting tool. Moreover, these
blades are very simple and can be used in countless varieties of
tools and equipment, so there is no chance of my bundle creating a
monopoly in the market for wood cutting blades. Such cases are
best analogized to nonforeclosing ties, which are ubiquitous. 27
The Cascade approach to mixed bundling, focusing almost
exclusively on the attribution test, creates the perverse result that
anticompetitive outcomes are suggested more often as the
secondary market becomes more competitive, thus leaving less
room for a discount that passes the attribution test. This fact makes
it essential to have a separate analysis of competitive effects in the
secondary market. Among the additional factors considered should
be the degree of complementarity that exists between the goods,
savings from reduction in joint costs, and the relationship between
scale and average cost.
2. Economies of scope and joint costs.
When two products share a common process or input they may
26. Some models of anticompetitive bundled discounts assume that the
secondary market is competitive. See, e.g., Patrick Greenlee, David
Reitman, and David S. Sibley, An Antitrust Analysis of Bundled Loyalty
Discounts (Oct. 30, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/single_firm/docs/220345.htm
(discussing both types of models).
27. See 9 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law
&&1722-1728 (2d ed. 2005).
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be subject to joint costs, or costs that are incurred only once when
the two products are produced together. Such situations are a
sufficient condition for economies of scope, which are average cost
savings that result from the coupled (as opposed to separate)
production of two goods. Significant savings in joint costs that
accrue from bundling might result in efficient bundles that flunk the
attribution test, depending on how the test is applied. Consider this
example:
Colds are treated with medicines Alpha for congestion and
Beta for coughs. Firm 1 has a dominant position in medicine
Alpha which costs $5 to manufacture. The process of
inserting Alpha into a capsule and packaging it
("encapsulating") costs $4. Firm 1 sells encapsulated Alpha
for $12, 3$ above its costs. Firm 1 also has a less substantial
position in a multi-firm market for Beta. Its Beta
manufacturing costs are $3 and it sells encapsulated Beta for
$8, which includes a $1 markup. Finally, the firm offers an
Alpha/Beta combination for $16. Because it costs no more to
encapsulate two drugs together than to encapsulate one
alone, it earns exactly the same markup as it would earn on
separate sales, but incurs the encapsulating costs only
once. 28
The discount on the encapsulated Alpha/Beta Combination is $4
off the price of purchasing two separate capsules. When that
discount is fully attributed to the costs of producing Beta separately
the price of encapsulated Beta drops to $4, which is $3 less than the
costs of producing free standing encapsulated Beta. Note first, that
this situation flunks the attribution test as the AMC states it. Second,
however, when the dominant firm encapsulates Alpha and Beta
together its incremental cost of adding Beta ($3) is less than the
incremental price ($4), so this transaction is fully profitable to the
dominant firm without regard to any output increase. In cases
involving joint costs, the relevant test must look at the marginal
profitability of bundling on a per unit basis. This alternative is
superior to the attribution test as proposed by the AMC because it
28. The illustration is adapted from the much more elaborate discussion
in David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie?
Evidence from Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying Law, 22 Yale
J. Reg. 37 (2005).
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takes joint costs into account:
To prove that a bundled discount was exclusionary or
predatory the plaintiff must establish that the incremental price
of the bundle (that is, the difference between the defendant’s
standalone price of A and its price of A + B) is less than the
incremental cost that the seller incurs when adding the B good
to the bundle. 29
In effect, this test asks whether the marginal profitability of the
bundle exceeds that of the standalone good A. If it does, long run
recoupment is not necessary. Indeed, bundling is profitable without
regard to any output increase and thus does not depend on the
exclusion of rivals. Furthermore, given our assumption that firms are
equally efficient, this new test works equally well in cases of bundling
that do not involve joint costs or economies of scope.
The concept of an “equally efficient rival” requires further
explanation in the presence of joint costs. If a rival does not sell all
goods within a firm’s bundle, it cannot acquire the joint cost savings
that result upon their combined production. Hence, the costs of
standalone production will not be an appropriate measure of
bundling efficiency. For example, suppose that the dominant firm
makes products A and B, while the rival makes only B. The two
firms are equally efficient with respect to all production and
distribution costs covering product B, except that cost element j is a
joint cost that someone producing A and B together need incur only
once. In that case the marginal cost of producing B for the
standalone firm would be C(B), while that for the firm that is already
producing A would be C(B) – j.
As a matter of policy one does not wish to prevent a dominant
firm from taking advantage of joint production efficiencies and
passing the savings on to consumers. But in the presence of joint
costs of this type the A producer will always have a cost advantage
in the B market over the standalone B producer whose production
costs are otherwise the same. One way to express this is simply to
say that in the presence of joint costs the standalone producer of B is
simply not the equally efficient rival that the law seeks to protect.
29. See appendix iii.

Bundled Discounts and AMC

13

In sum, the attribution test defined by the AMC is unreliable and
yields false positives in the presence of joint costs or economies of
scope. This fact is crucial because cost savings very likely explain a
high percentage of bundled discounts. In the Cascade decision, for
example, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the attribution test should
apply even though the presence of joint costs was highly likely. The
plaintiff and defendant were competing hospitals. The defendant
offered primary, secondary, and tertiary medical care while the
plaintiff offered only primary and secondary care. The dispute arose
when the defendant sold its three types of care in a bundle for a
substantial discount. While we are not familiar with the entire record
in the Cascade decision, the literature on hospital care indicates that
as a general matter primary, secondary, and tertiary care are subject
to very significant joint costs. 30 For example, a piece of durable
medical equipment such as a CT scanner might be used for both
secondary and tertiary care, making the costs of combining the two
types of care in a common facility significantly lower than the costs of
separate provision. A hospital contains numerous facilities and
technologies whose costs can be spread across all three types of
care, and the cost savings from grouping primary, secondary and
tertiary care could be very significant. In that case the Ninth Circuit
should have asked whether the incremental price of the bundle that
included tertiary care services was sufficient to cover the incremental
costs of providing such services, given that many of the facilities
necessary for their provision were already in place. 31

30. Colin Preyra and George Pink, Scale and Scope Efficiencies
Through Hospital Consolidations, 25 J.Health Econ. 1049 (2006);
Deborah Haas-Wilson, Managed Care and Monopoly Power 146
(2003).
31. Cf. 10 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &1758d
(discount conditioned on defendant's acceptance of a tie is lawful if the
discount does no more than pass on cost savings of joint provision).
A similar situation arises in orthodox predatory pricing cases when the
defendant adds a product in a facility subject to joint costs. The correct
question is whether the incremental cost of adding the product is fully covered
by the price of that product. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law
&742 (3d ed. 2008).
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3. Price Discrimination

Price discrimination occurs when a seller receives differing ratios
of price to marginal cost on different sales. Bundling creates
opportunities for price discrimination when a buyer or group of
buyers places a value on a particular bundle that differs from the
value that other buyers may place on a different bundle containing
the same primary good, or on the standalone primary good. A
bundled discount can facilitate price discrimination, assuming that
arbitrage is not possible. 32
For example suppose that for buyer 1, WTP ("willingness to pay")
for A = 10 and WTP for B = 0. For buyer 2, WTP for A = 8 and WTP
for B = 6. If we assume the cost of producing B is 4 and A is 5, then
the firm will elect to set standalone prices of 8 for A and 6 for B,
earning a total profit of $8. Alternatively, it can charge standalone
prices of 10 for A and 6 for B, but a bundled price of 14. In this case
the firm earns a total profit of $10. The difference in these profits
represents the consumer surplus of buyer 1, which could only be
extracted through bundling. 33 Notice that this bundle fails the
attribution test. Nevertheless, the profitability of bundling in this case
does not depend on the exclusion of any rival, although it may
exclude one in fact.

32. Arbitrage occurs when the low price buyer is able to resell the good
to the buyer asked to pay a higher price.
On price discrimination possibilities from bundling, see Dennis W.
Carlton and Michael Waldman, Safe Harbors for Quantity Discounts and
Bundling (Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper, Antitrust Division,
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Jan. 2008), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/eag/230712.htm. See also Antitrust
Modernization Commission, Report, Separate Statement of Commissioner
Carlton (2007), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/separate_statemen
ts.pdf. For more technical treatment see Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffrey
Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization, ch. 10, at 324-330 (2005).
33. In order to sell the bundle, customers would need to receive at least
as much consumer surplus for buying the bundle as they would receive for
buying either standalone good. Hence we would often expect to see
customers of the bundle retain some consumer surplus.
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One significant factor in price discriminatory bundling is what
changes if any are made in the price of A at the time bundling is
imposed. Accordingly, we consider bundling strategies in both
cases.
The price of A remains the same
If the price of A is unchanged and the bundle flunks the
attribution test, then the firm must expand output in order for the
strategy to be profitable. 34 This is true because this sort of bundling
is effectively a price cut. It provides A at a discounted rate to
customers who also want B. If the bundle fails the attribution test,
the firm must earn its additional profit through increased volume.
This can have important implications. First, price discrimination
that results in reduced output virtually never increases welfare. 35
Price discrimination that increases output can increase welfare and
may do so most of the time, particularly if the output increase is
substantial and costs are relatively unchanged. 36 It should be noted
that output increasing price discrimination can exclude anyone from
whom the discrimination strategy steals sufficient sales of the B
good. In the presence of scale economies, this impact can be
magnified by the reduction of competitor efficiency. In this case, the
monopolist forces a decline in both the production and the efficiency
of rivals, squeezing profit from two directions. However, such a
strategy can be profitable regardless of its impact on rivals.
If the price of A is unchanged, one can conclude that (1) if the
bundling in question is being used to facilitate price discrimination;

34. For a proof and explanation, see appendix ii.
35. See Marius Schwartz, Third-Degree Price Discrimination and Output:
Generalizing a Welfare Result, 80 Am.Econ.Rev. 1259 (Dec. 1990); Richard
Schmalensee, Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree
Price Discrimination, 71 Am.Econ.Rev. 242 (1981); Hal R. Varian, Price
Discrimination and Social Welfare, 75 Am.Econ.Rev. 870 (1985).
36. Varian, ibid., proves this result where the reservation price is
decreasing. See also J. A. Hausman and J. K. MacKie-Mason, Price
discrimination and patent policy, 19 RAND J. Econ. 253-265 (1988).
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then (2) it is likely to increase welfare; and (3) the failure of the
attribution test is not a good indicator that a bundling strategy is an
exclusionary practice. The strategy is likely to be profitable in the
short run, with profits resulting from immediately increased output.
Price of A rises upon bundling
When the standalone price of A rises from the previous
standalone price at the time a bundle is introduced the effect on
social welfare can be more adverse. The bundle may not need to
increase output in order to be profitable, as it may simply increase
profitability at the margin. 37 This would most likely occur in markets
where the demand for A is inelastic and the bundled good is a
complement. In effect, bundling can be used to appeal to different
consumer groups, making it possible for such a strategy to be overall
profit increasing.
If the discounted price of A in the bundle is greater than its
previous individual price, most consumers are worse off. This
strategy is effectively a price hike, and will almost certainly restrict
output. It should be noted that the price of A can be raised to any
level, provided the bundled discount is increased accordingly. 38 In
such situations, the standalone price of A may become so high that
nearly everyone would rather buy the bundle. This is effectively an
implied instance of pure bundling, or tying, as the only good being
sold at a reasonable price is the bundle. The monopolist conditions
the purchase of B on nearly all purchases of A. If enough of the
market for B is satisfied by these bundles, the strategy may force
rivals to exit.
For example, suppose I possess the sole manufacturing rights
for a patented clothes dryer that works with twice the speed of most
others. I begin by selling my dryer for $1400, which is $400 above
cost. Washing machines are sold in a moderately competitive
market at a price of $1000, which includes a $250 markup. I then
decide to bundle my dryer with a generic washing machine at a price
37. See appendix ii.
38. See, e.g., Greenlee, Patrick, Reitman, David S. and Sibley, David
S., "An Antitrust Analysis of Bundled Loyalty Discounts" (October 30,
2006). Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper No. 04-13 (Revised)

Bundled Discounts and AMC

17

of $2500, which is now $750 above cost. At the same time I raise
the standalone price of the dryer to $2000. Because the cost of
producing a washer is $750, the bundle fails the attribution test. But
because washers and dryers are strongly complementary, most
people will buy the bundle if they want my dryer. Thus, if there is a
strong demand for my dryer, I would expect to see many of my rivals
in the market for washing machines face foreclosure. However, I
now make a greater profit on the bundle than I previously made on
the dryer alone. As such, this strategy is profitable regardless of its
impact on my competitors. 39 The fact that few consumers are likely
to buy my standalone dryer is irrelevant.
Alternatively, we may observe a situation in which the bundle fails
the attribution test relative even to the previous standalone price of
A. Hence the bundle truly does discount the A good with respect to
the price it retained before bundling. In such cases it may be
necessary for a firm to expand output in order to increase total
profit. 40
In sum, even in the case of a price increase in A, the profitability
of price discriminatory bundling need not depend on the exclusion of
a rival. The increased profits could just as easily come from higher
revenues of the standalone dryers, or else from increased sales to
buyers of the washer-dryer package.
That naturally invites the question of an appropriate antitrust rule.
As a matter of competition policy, suppose the plaintiff can show that
(1) a bundle fails the attribution test and (2) that the defendant
increased the price of the A good significantly upon imposing
bundling. Of course a private plaintiff would have to show market
wide exclusion, which entails a showing that there are no other
efficient producers of the bundle and that existing producers of the B
good cannot compete effectively. Even this set of showings does not
rule out the possibility of competitively harmless conduct. The lack
of any significant number of standalone sales of the A product might
mitigate in favor of liability by essentially establishing that the

39. If two goods are less complementary, this sort of bundling strategy
is less effective.
40. For necessary conditions of increased output, see appendix ii.
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defendant is tying. 41 Additionally, insignificant complementarity
between the goods may indicate that the bundling strategy would not
be an effective means of price discrimination when standalone prices
rise significantly.
Competitive Bundling under Oligopoly or Collusion
Many bundles that fail the attribution test are nothing more than
price discrimination achieved by disguised price cuts in oligopolistic
markets or those that are subject to collusion. For example, suppose
that the cost of a car is $20,000 and a car stereo costs $500. The
car sells in an oligopolistic market for $25,000. The car seller is
reluctant to cut the nominal price, which is readily observed by rivals,
but agrees to throw in the stereo at an incremental price of $100, for
a package price of $25,100. 42 The deal flunks the attribution test
because the incremental price of the bundle is less than incremental
cost, but it is also a way of competing in oligopoly and even under
explicit collusion that antitrust policy should encourage. Prohibiting
deals of this sort simply stabilizes oligopolies. In fact, oligopolies
often fall apart because firms engage in nonprice competition of this
sort, and nonprice competition is an important characteristic of
monopolistic competition. 43
For example, in Multistate Legal Studies the defendant offered a
course intended for those about to take the "multistate" portion of a
state bar exam (MBE). The defendant offered a "full service" course
intended to cover the entire bar exam, as well as an MBE
supplemental course, intended to improve students' performance
only on the multistate portion of the exam. The antitrust dispute
arose when the defendant bundled its full service and MBE courses
41. On package discounts treated as tying arrangements, see 10 Phillip
E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &1758b (discussing
decisions and suggesting that few than 10 percent of separate sales
constitutes a de facto tie); see also Cascade, note 11, 515 F.3d at 915
(denying summary judgment on tying claim where roughly 14 percent of sales
were separate). See appendix ii.
42. See 3A Areeda and Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, note 6 at &749c.
43. The classic treatment is George J. Stigler, Price and Non-Price
Competition, 76 J.Pol.Econ. 149 (1968).
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and sold them at a package price less than the sum of the prices of
the separate components -- indeed, initially the defendant included
its MBE course "free" to all who purchased its full service course. 44
The Tenth Circuit found predatory pricing possible on the theory that,
while the cost of offering the MBE materials separately was
approximately $15, they were priced predatorily when included "free"
with the full service course. 45 But no MBE course was ever given
away; it was "free" only to those who took the full service course, and
the court cited no evidence that the package price was less than any
measure of cost for the entire package. As a result, the package
pricing could have been a completely profitable, or "sustainable,"
strategy, for which no recoupment is necessary and thus which is
inappropriately condemned as predation.
Suppose the defendant sells 100 copies of its full service course
for $500, at a cost of $400. The defendant then bundles a "free"
MBE course, which costs $15, and its sales increase to 150 copies.
Before the bundling, the defendant sold 100 copies at $100 profit, for
$10,000. After the bundling the defendant sold 150 copies at $85
profit, for $12,750. Even though the MBE course has been bundled
for "free," there are no losses requiring recoupment. The bundling is
profitable both in the short run and the long run. Or to state it
differently, the bundling and effective price cut are profitable not
because they are calculated to destroy or discipline rivals and permit
subsequent monopoly pricing; they are profitable simply because
they yield higher immediate output from higher immediate sales -precisely what competitive, as opposed to predatory, price cuts do.
Ad Hoc Negotiation Among Customers with Varying Bundled Needs
Customers of an intermediate good may place differential values
on it depending on how they use it in combination with some other
good, B,C, or D, all of which sell in competitively or moderately
competitive markets. The seller designs bundles of A-B, A-C, or AD, each of which is designed to exploit the reservation price of
various users by tracking them to the secondary product that they
44. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Prof'l.
Pub'ns., Inc., 63 F.3d 1540 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1044
(1996).
45. Id. at 1549, 1551 (reversing grant of summary judgment).
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must use.
For example, suppose that the monopolist owns a patented
mixing agent that keeps contents of various suspensions from
"settling" into the bottom of the container. The cost of the mixing
agent is $5 per unit and it works with salad dressings, paint, and
pharmaceutical suspensions, all of which are sold in competitive
markets. The profit-maximizing standalone price is $8.00, but the
WTP of the salad dressing producers is $6, of paint is $8. and of
pharmaceutical suspensions is $10. The mixing agent monopolist
then becomes a distributor of these three products, inserts the
mixing agent, and adds to the basic product price the WTP of each
of the three groups of customers. In this case, the strategy is simply
an implicit method of group pricing: Charging a different price to
different consumer groups. The actual bundling is merely a means
of preventing arbitrage.
III.

Recoupment

The second element of the AMC test for bundles requires a
showing of "recoupment." Here, some re-definition is necessary.
The term recoupment has come to mean different things in different
situations. The strong version of recoupment is the one the
Supreme Court articulated in its Brooke Group and Weyerhaeuser
decisions, which are generally read to require dollars-and-cents
proof that a dominant firm can predict that a given investment in
predatory pricing will be followed by a period of monopoly profits
sufficiently certain and sufficiently large that, when discounted to
present value, it gives the predation investment a positive payoff.
Further, the Court envisioned single product predatory pricing as a
firm's incurring of immediate losses by charging below cost prices. 46
Such a strategy could not be rational, the Court reasoned, unless the
defendant had a reasonable prospect of recouping those losses in
some subsequent time period of monopoly profits. 47
46. Brooke Group Ltd., v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209 (1993) (Robinson-Patman Act); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons
Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 127 S.Ct. 1069 (2007) (Sherman Act '2).
47. See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 224:
Recoupment is the ultimate object of an unlawful predatory pricing
scheme; it is the means by which a predator profits from predation.
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The two-time-period recoupment requirement is in part a
consequence of the fact that predatory pricing, as Brooke Group also
defined it, is a non-sustainable strategy. Only prices below an
appropriate level of cost are predatory. As a result, the predator
cannot "make it up on volume" during the predation period -- the
more it sells at the predatory price the more money it loses.
"Cost" is not the true baseline for measuring recoupment,
however, and as a result the need for recoupment does not depend
on the sustainability of the strategy. Rather, the baseline is the
profits that the dominant firm was earning prior to implementation of
the strategy. In sum, what must be recouped is the opportunity costs
of predation. Even a price cut to above cost levels is rational only if it
generates some kind of payoff. 48 In this case the payoff need not be
observed only in the long run, as reduced margin can be outweighed
by increased volume.
The mixed bundling strategies under discussion here are
"sustainable" in the sense that the overall price of the bundle is
Without it, predatory pricing produces lower aggregate prices in the
market, and consumer welfare is enhanced....
and id. at 225-226:
... The plaintiff must demonstrate that there is a likelihood that the
predatory scheme alleged would cause a rise in prices above a
competitive level that would be sufficient to compensate for the
amounts expended on the predation, including the time value of the
money invested in it. As we have observed on a prior occasion, "[i]n
order to recoup their losses, [predators] must obtain enough market
power to set higher than competitive prices, and then must sustain
those prices long enough to earn in excess profits what they earlier
gave up in below-cost prices."
quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 590591 (1986). For elaboration, see 3A Areeda and Hovenkamp, note 6 at
&&725-727.
48. The AMR Report recognizes this. It speaks of the "profits" sacrificed
by bundling that must be recouped. See Report, note 4 at 98.
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above cost. The "loss" that occurs results from the fact that net
revenue per unit sold, while positive, is less than it is under separate
pricing. In that case the opportunity cost of the strategy is the
reduced short-term profits that the dominant firm earns during the
bundling period.
Consider this example: firm X dominates the market for
product A, for which costs are $5 and the standalone monopoly price
is $8. It also sells product B in a more competitive market, where
costs are $2 and the price is $3. Finally, it sells an A/B bundle at a
price of $9. On the one hand, the price of the bundle is well above
firm X's costs, which are $7. On the other hand, the incremental
revenue that firm X obtains from bundling is less than the
incremental cost of assembling the bundle, so the firm earns less
money on each unit of the bundle than it would from separate sales.
As such, each customer who buys the bundle instead of the
standalone good A imposes a relative loss on the monopolist.
Such a strategy could nevertheless be profitable for either of two
different reasons. First, bundling might make it impossible for
standalone sellers of product B to survive. Once these sellers have
exited the market then firm X intends to drop bundling and raise the
price of B as well as A. This would be recoupment in the sense that
Brooke Group envisioned it. 49
The other possibility is that the A/B bundle is profitable because it
operates as a selective above cost price cut that stimulates sales,
although it may exclude rivals in the process. Although standalone
sales will now yield less profits than before, bundling greatly
increases the number of total sales and profits are higher as a result.
For example, suppose I sell bagels, which cost $4.00 a dozen, at a
price of $6.00 per dozen. Then I throw in a container of cream cheese
which costs $2.50 at an incremental price of $2.00, or $8.00 for the
bagel/cream cheese combination. Packaging in this way flunks the
attribution test, but my $8.00 price is still well above my $6.50 costs
and this strategy might be profitable simply because it increases my
sales volume. Significantly, the strategy could even be profitable in a
highly competitive market and without regard to the exclusion of any
rival.

49. See appendix iv.
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In the latter case "recoupment" is assuredly necessary in the
sense that any rational pricing strategy must have a positive payoff.
But recoupment here is a completely different thing from the
recoupment that Brooke Group envisioned. Most importantly, the
price cut and the "recoupment" occur simultaneously. 50
In this sense an anticompetitive bundled discount that fails the
attribution test but is nevertheless above cost is somewhat
analogous to so-called "limit" pricing, a term that describes a variety
of above cost pricing strategies designed to exclude rivals from a
market or restrain their growth. 51 The important difference is that
limit pricing is not likely to succeed if the dominant firm and its rivals
are equally efficient. 52 Bundling might succeed, however, provided
50. As Dennis Carlton, one of the AMC Commissioner's observed:
The second prong of the AMC safe harbor test is recoupment.
The AMC test asks whether the price of B could rise, just as in
the standard predation story when the first prong of the
predation test ("is price below cost?") is passed. This makes
perfect sense in terms of the context of the standard story of
price predation in a dynamic setting. The court in Peacehealth
dismissed this prong by claiming that there can be
"simultaneous" recoupment. What the court means is that in
equilibrium there will be no producers of only B, so that the
price of B will be high. There is an instantaneous recoupment
if the predation happens quickly or if the threat of predation
deters entry. There is no dynamic story in the court's thought
process - the decision cites Nalebuff (2005) who uses a static
model - while there is a dynamic story underlying the AMC
test. Whether the recoupment is simultaneous or delayed, as
it is in the usual price predation story, is a detail. The key
issue is whether the price of B can rise above the competitive
level.
Carlton and Waldman, note 16.
For further explanation, see appendix iv.
51. We need not consider bundles priced below cost, as they would just
be standard cases of price predation and can be treated as such. See, e.g.,
Carlton and Perloff, note 32, Ch. 11.
52. Ibid.
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that the dominant firm produces goods inside the bundle that rivals
do not produce.
Importantly, "recoupment" is also relevant even to limit pricing,
although it is not the type of recoupment that Brooke Group
envisioned. Limit pricing entails that a firm is charging less than its
short-run profit-maximizing price and as a result it earns less per
time period than it would by charging a higher price, assuming that
new rivals do not enter or existing rivals increase their output. The
recoupment question really amounts to whether the extended
duration of market dominance that limit pricing produces yields
enough additional revenue to offset the lower profits per time period
that limit pricing entails. 53
Brooke Group developed its recoupment requirement in the
context of non-sustainable predation involving below cost sales, but
all strategies involving price cuts require some kind of "recoupment"
in the sense that the loss of revenue per unit must be made up
somewhere else. 54 Any time a firm cuts its price, even to a level that
is above cost, the price cut reduces total profits unless there is a
payoff in the form of (a) exclusion followed by a later price increase;
or (b) higher output under the reduced (but nevertheless profitable)
price. 55
In sum, assuming that the price of the package as a whole is
above cost, the AMC's "recoupment" recommendation for package
discount cases could take either of two forms:
1. If the package discount is intended to exclude rivals that do
not make all products in the package in order to drive them
53. See 3A Areeda & Hovenkamp, note 6, &736b1. For a graphical
interpretation, see appendix iv.
54. For contrary views, see Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost
Predatory Pricing, 111 Yale L.J. 941, 942 (2002); Einer Elhauge, Why AboveCost Price Cuts To Drive Out Entrants Are Not Predatory--and the
Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power, 112 Yale L.J. 681, 697 n.
51 (2003).
55. See appendix iv. In addition, it should be noted that pre-bundling
prices may not exist in all situations, as a firm may have initiated the
bundling strategy at the same time that it introduced its primary good.
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out of business, then the recoupment issue is whether the
cost of offering the package discount in the short run will be
offset by some future period of monopoly prices after the
rivals have exited from the market. The baseline for
measuring the cost of this strategy is not marginal cost or
average variable cost, but rather total pre-discount profits (i.e.,
the opportunity cost of the short-run discount strategy).
2. If the package discount's profitability depends on currently
increased output, then "recoupment" depends on the current
profitability of the package price cut.
Number one describes an at least presumptively anticompetitive
scenario -- low prices today followed by higher prices tomorrow, with
a net injury to consumers. Recoupment would certainly be no easier
to measure than in a conventional predatory pricing case, but in
principle it would be much the same. One would compare the
decline in profitability during the short-run period in which the
exclusionary bundling occurred, and weigh it against the present
value of any future recoupment period, taking into account the risk of
failure and other difficulties that can reasonably be anticipated. 56
Number two is much messier. First of all, an output increase is in
and of itself presumptively competitive. Second, any injuries could
come from ongoing suppression of rivals, an ongoing exclusion
strategy, or raising of rivals' costs. These practices create effects
that are akin to limit pricing -- something the law does not condemn
in the single-product setting 57 -- but also to tying and exclusive
dealing, both of which recognize the existence of sustainable
strategies that are thought to be anticompetitive because they
suppress the output of rivals or raise their costs.
None of this matters very much if we abandon the strict
recoupment requirement altogether and adhere to some more basic
structural principles -- namely, that monopolization requires a market
with high entry barriers and economies of scale that persist over high
output ranges relative to demand at cost prices. One problem with
the recoupment problem as Brooke Group articulated it is the great
56. See 3A Areeda and Hovenkamp, note 6 at &&726-727.
57. See id., &&736-737.

26

Bundled Discounts and AMC

information demands it makes in close cases. Predicting the length
and opportunity cost of a predation strategy, what the likely
recoupment (supracompetitive) price would be, when entry might
occur and how quickly it would move prices back to the competitive
level is typically an exercise in pure speculation except in very
obvious situations. A better approach for litigation purposes is to
abandon the strict recoupment requirement, but ensure that the
market at issue is one that is structurally capable of being
monopolized.
As a result, we believe the best solution to this problem is to
abandon the recoupment problem as articulated in Brooke Group
altogether. To be sure, in extreme cases on both ends the relevant
information might be readily obtained and a prediction fairly clear.
But in the vast middle any testimony that profitable recoupment in
the Brooke Group sense would or would not result is bound to
involve significant amounts of conjecture. 58 Indeed, it is not clear
that Brooke Group itself demanded "dollars and cents" proof of
recoupment. The Court said:
The plaintiff must demonstrate that there is a likelihood that
the predatory scheme alleged would cause a rise in prices
above a competitive level that would be sufficient to
compensate for the amounts expended on the predation,
including the time value of the money invested in it. 59
The operative word here is "likelihood," which in the context
means "a good chance," or perhaps "reasonable probability." A few
sentences later the Court elaborated that:
If market circumstances or deficiencies in proof would bar a
reasonable jury from finding that the scheme alleged would
likely result in sustained supracompetitive pricing, the
plaintiff's case has failed. 60

58. In the context of traditional predatory pricing, see Areeda and
Hovenkamp, note 6 at &726d5.
59. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 227-228.
60. Ibid.
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In sum, the plaintiff must show a "likelihood," or good chance,
that a below cost pricing scheme would be followed by a period of
"sustained supracompetitive pricing." A clear showing of significant
scale economies in the relevant range, meaningful entry barriers and
a dominant firm should suffice for this purpose. 61
IV. Conclusion: Anticompetitive Effects
In addition to a package discount that fails the attribution test and
a showing of recoupment, the AMC Report’s third requirement is a
showing of an adverse effect on competition. 62 In its Cascade
decision the Ninth Circuit dismissed this requirement as simply

61. See Donald J. Boudreaux, Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, The
Supreme Court's Predation Odyssey; from Fruit Pies to Cigarettes, 4
Sup.Ct.Econ.Rev. 57, 73 (1995) (citing a set of less technical criteria as
tending to establish the recoupment requirement and justifying further inquiry
into price-cost relationships:
$

Does the alleged predator currently confront substantial competition
from noncollusive rivals (other than its intended victims) within the
relevant market?

$

Is entry into the relevant market devoid of high entry barriers?

$

Do customers in the alleged market have credible counter-strategies
that are likely to defeat a predatory scheme?

$

Is the industry in rapid decline?
Only if the previous questions are answered in the negative would a
court be justified in allowing the parties to undertake the expensive
and complicated task of gathering and presenting data on price-cost
comparisons.

Elzinga and Mills were the two authors that the Supreme Court relied on
for the recoupment requirement in Brooke Group itself. See Kenneth G.
Elzinga & David E. Mills, Testing for Predation: Is Recoupment Feasible?, 34
Antitrust Bull. 869 (1989). See also Cyril Ritter, Does the Law of Predatory
Pricing and Cross-Subsidisation Need a Radical Rethink, 27 World
Competition 613 (2004).
62. Report, note 4 at 99.
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restating the "antitrust injury" requirement. 63 That is not the way the
Supreme Court defined "antitrust injury" in its Brunswick decision,
which held that a plaintiff could not complain about increased
competition brought about by an allegedly unlawful vertical merger,
because doing so was inimical to the goals of the antitrust laws. 64
Since Brunswick, however, lower courts including the Ninth Circuit
have repeatedly used the term "antitrust injury" as kind of a catch-all
to refer to competitive injury or injury-in-fact. 65
Using the term "antitrust injury" as a substitute for anticompetitive
effects in a '2 case is a bad idea because antitrust injury is required
in all private antitrust actions, even those involving per se offenses. 66
By contrast the structural and behavioral requirements for unlawful
monopolization are severe and specific to that statute. If a rival was
injured by an unlawful exclusionary practice then its injury was
antitrust injury, but one still has to establish that the injury fell within
the boundaries of the monopolization offense.
Further, given the very large number of false positives that the
63. Cascade, note 11, 515 F.3d at 910:
The third element proposed by the AMC is that the bundled
discount or rebate program has had or is likely to have an
adverse effect on competition. AMC Report, supra, at 99. We
view this final element as redundant because it is no different
than the general requirement of antitrust injury that a plaintiff
must prove in any private antitrust action.
64. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489
(1977). See 2A Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &337
(3d ed. 2007).
65. See, e.g., SmileCare Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan, 88 F.3d 780
(9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1028 (1996); Syufy Enters. v. American
Multicinema, Inc., 793 F.2d 990, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1031 (1987); Catlin v. Washington Energy Co., 791 F.2d 1343, 1347
(9th Cir. 1986); Dolphin Tours, Inc. v. Pacifico Creative Serv., Inc., 773 F.2d
1506, 1509 (9th Cir. 1985); Northwest Pub., Inc. v. Crumb, 752 F.2d 473, 476
(9th Cir. 1985); and see 2A Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, note 64 at
&337a.
66. Id., &337c.
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attribution test produces, a per se rule is hardly in order. Competitive
effects must be assessed in each case. Here, as in most rule of
reason cases, rational shortcuts must be developed. At a minimum,
we would require the following:
$

The defendant is a dominant firm in a market
structurally conducive to durable monopoly (our
equivalent of recoupment). Entry barriers and
economies of scale must both be significant.

$

The defendant does not have a significant rival who
produces the full range of goods in the bundle in
dispute. If that were the case, the bundle does not
force all rivals to price below cost. The orthodox
predatory pricing rule requiring overall prices below
cost applies.

$

The defendant's bundle flunks the attribution test over a
sufficient range of sales to cause an inference of
substantial harm to the rival (presumably the plaintiff),
either driving it from the market or raising its costs and
thus allowing the defendant to increase prices in the
secondary market.

$

The defendant cannot show significant joint costs or
economies of scope that justify bundling, which would
entail a showing that the per-unit profit earned on the
bundle exceeds that earned on the standalone good.
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APPENDICES
In each appendix, we let A denote the monopoly good while B
denotes the secondary good, which is sold in a market that is at least
somewhat competitive. We let β denote the bundle A + B.

Appendix i: Equivalence of the two prevailing accounts of the
attribution test
The two definitions given for the attribution test are mathematically
equivalent, though they are given in terms of different variables.
Let d denote the value of the bundled discount. Explicitly we have that:
d = P(A) + P(B) – P(β)
where P(A) and P(B) denote the individual prices of A and B, and P(β)
denotes the price of the bundle (A + B).
We denote the marginal costs of A, B, and β as MC(A), MC(B)
and MC(β) respectively. For our purposes, we consider the marginal
cost levels that firms observe at the time bundling is introduced.
Accordingly, the accounts of the two definitions of the attribution test
are as follows:
Account 1:
To prove that a bundled discount is exclusionary or predatory for the
purposes of a monopolization or attempted monopolization claim under
' 2 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must establish that, after allocating
the discount given by the defendant on the entire bundle of products to
the competitive product or products, the defendant sold the competitive
product or products below its average variable cost of producing them
[quoting Cascade].
Explicitly, account 1 can be given as:
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Account 2:
To prove that a bundled discount was exclusionary or predatory for the
purposes of a monopolization or attempted monopolization claim under
' 2 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must establish that the incremental
price of the bundle (that is, the difference between the defendant's
standalone price of A and its price of A + B) is less than the marginal
cost of producing the B good. [or alternatively, less than the average
variable cost of producing the B good).
Explicitly, account 2 can be given as:

By substituting [P(A) + P(B) – P(β)] for d in the first equation, we find
that that the two accounts of the attribution test are mathematically
identical. Observing the tests in the vector form {pass, fail}, we have
that:
Account 1 = {P(B) – d ≥ MC(B), P(B) – d < MC(B)}
= {P(B) – P(A) – P(B) + P(β) ≥ MC(B), P(B) – P(A) – P(B) +
P(β) < MC(B)}
= {P(β) – P(A) ≥ MC(B), P(β) – P(A) < MC(B)}
= Account 2
Hence, we see that the two accounts of the attribution test given in
many cases (not involving joint costs) are actually equivalent. There
is, however, a different way to define the test that can also effectively
provide “safe harbor” in the presence of scope economies, or joint
costs. See appendix iii.

Appendix ii: Output requirements of profitable bundling
strategies
In order grant safe harbor more effectively, we will determine the
conditions under which total output (of A) must increase for a
bundling strategy to be profitable regardless of its impact on rivals.
These can be used to supplement decisions regarding the propriety
of a bundling strategy.
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We make the following assumptions in each case:
1) The bundle fails the attribution test with respect to the
standalone price of A observed upon bundling.
2) Each bundling strategy is profitable without regard to its
impact on rivals.
3) The price of the bundle, P(β), is greater than the standalone
price of any good within the bundle.
4) All firms are equally efficient.
5) No joint costs or scope economies are observed by firms.
6) The monopolist does not sell the secondary good, B,
individually.
Case 1: Individual price of A remains the same
In this first case, we assume that the standalone price of A does not
change upon bundling. We define the marginal or per-unit
profitability of both the bundle and the standalone good A. It is very
important to note that because we are considering only specific price
levels, marginal profit will always be equal to that price minus the
marginal cost of production. As a matter of practicality, it would be
most appropriate to consider that level of marginal cost which is
observed immediately before bundling is introduced. Of course, in
some cases it might be necessary to use a measure of average
variable cost in lieu of any reliable way to estimate marginal cost. In
any case, we simply require some realistic measures of per-unit
profits, as they exist both immediately before and immediately after
bundling is introduced. The difference between these values
represents the difference between the incremental price and the
incremental cost of bundling (with respect to the standalone good A).
MPA = P(A) – MC(A)
MPβ = P(β) – MC(A) – MC(B)
= P(A) + P(B) – d – MC(A) – MC(B)
Where APx denotes the marginal or per-unit profitability of x, P(x)
denotes the price of x, and MC(x) marginal cost of x. Again, the
value of the bundled discount, d, is defined as d = P(A) + P(B) –
P(β).
Because we assume the strategy fails the attribution test, we can
show that the marginal or per-unit profitability of the bundle must be
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less than that of the standalone good A. In order to show this
explicitly, we define the difference in marginal profitability, which we
will denote as L:
L = d + MC(B) – P(B)
(Because the attribution test is failed, we know that L is positive)
Accordingly:
MPβ = MPA – L
And hence,
MPA > MPβ
Further, we can define the condition for a bundling strategy to be
profitable when the standalone price of A remains the same:
QA2(MPA) + Qβ(MPβ) ≥ QA1MPA
where QA1 is the quantity of the standalone good A sold prior to
bundling and QA2 is the quantity of the standalone good sold after
bundling becomes available. It should be noted that QA2 does not
represent the total quantity of A produced upon bundling, as some
units of A are sold in bundles. Rather, it only represents the quantity
of standalone units of A that are sold in the market. Because a
discount is offered on the bundle, we will observe that QA1 > QA2, as
the bundle will attract some customers who formerly bought only the
standalone A.
Solving for relative output levels:
QA2(MPβ + L) + Qβ(MPβ) ≥ QA1(MPβ + L)
QA2(MPβ) + QA2(L) + Qβ(MPβ) ≥ QA1(MPβ) + QA1(L)
QA2 + Qβ ≥ QA1 + (QA1 – QA2)(L ⁄ MPβ)
Thus, because (QA1 – QA2)(L ⁄ MPβ) is positive, we have that:
QA2 + Qβ ≥ QA1
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Hence, if a bundling strategy does not raise the price of A, it must
increase output if it is to be profitable without regard to exclusion.
What if the price of A rises upon bundling?
For cases 2 and 3, we assume the standalone price of A rises upon
bundling.
Because there are now two prices of A being considered and
therefore two levels of marginal or per-unit profitability. We define
the following:
P1(A) = The standalone price of A before bundling
P2(A) = The standalone price of A after bundling
where P2(A) > P1(A).
Accordingly, we can define the corresponding levels of marginal or
per-unit profit as:
MPA1 = P1(A) – MC(A)
MPA2 = P2(A) – MC(A)
Where MPA2 > MPA1.
As in case 1, we define the difference in marginal profitability
between the bundle and the standalone good A. However, with two
levels of marginal profit to consider, we will have two such
differences to define.
Accordingly:
MPA1 = MPβ + L
MPA2 = MPβ + L
where L > L.
For a given standalone price of A, a bundle fails the attribution test if
the corresponding difference in marginal profitability is positive.
Although the discount given by a bundle will be measured relative to
the new price, we will consider both prices. As such, we will
examine two cases: First, we consider situations in which the bundle
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fails the attribution test with respect to both prices of A, giving that
both L and L must be positive. Then we consider situations in
which the bundle only fails the attribution test with respect to the new
price, in which case only L is positive.
Case 2: Individual price of A rises; both L and L are positive
To begin, it will suffice to assert that the total profit resulting from
standalone sales of A will decline. This happens because the
bundled discount will persuade many consumers to buy the bundle
rather than only the standalone good A. Also, we assume the
previous standalone price of A was profit maximizing and thus any
deviation from it would result in reduced profits.
Hence:
QA1 (MPA1) > QA2(MPA2)
where QA1 > QA2.
The amount by which total standalone profits fall represents the
amount of profit which must be made up by bundled sales if the
strategy is to be profitable. To observe the net effect on output, we
determine what amount of the standalone profit reduction is
attributable to each lost standalone sale of A. If this amount is
greater than the per-unit profitability of the bundle, then the number
of bundles that must be sold is greater than the number of lost
standalone sales of A. In such a case total production of A must
increase for the strategy to be profitable.
Hence, if a bundling strategy is to be profitable without regard to
foreclosure, output must increase if the following condition holds:
QA1(MPA1) – QA2(MPA2)] ⁄ (QA1 – QA2) > MPβ
QA1(MPA1) – QA2(MPA2) > (QA1 – QA2)MPβ
QA1(MPβ + L) – QA2(MPβ + L) > QA1(MPβ) – QA2(MPβ)
QA1(MPβ) + QA1(L) – QA2(MPβ) – QA2(L) > QA1(MPβ) – QA2(MPβ)
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QA1(L) – QA2(L) > 0
QA1(L) > QA2(L)
QA1 ⁄ QA2 > L ⁄ L

Case 3: Individual price of A rises; L is positive; L is negative
In this case, the bundle fails the attribution test with respect to the
new price, but not the price maintained before bundling. If the
strategy is to be profitable, the total profit lost on standalone sales
can be regained through increased margin; it need not result in the
expanded production of A.
Following the same process used in case 2, such a firm must
increase output if the following holds:
QA1(L) > QA2(L)
Given that the left-hand side is now negative, this condition cannot
possibly be met, as the right-hand side is positive. Hence, increased
output is never a necessary condition for this sort of bundling to be
profitable.
The conditions given in these three cases describe the
circumstances under which a firm must increase output in order for
its bundling strategy to be profitable. They do not imply that a firm
who does not meet the relevant condition cannot increase output.
Rather, they tell us that if a firm meets one of these conditions and
has not increased total output of A, then the bundling strategy is not
profitable without regard to its affect on rivals. Thus, if a firm is to
benefit from the decision, they must capitalize on the foreclosure of
rivals.
Another implication is that if firms are assumed equally
efficient, the attribution test can be defined in terms of new variables:
the marginal or per-unit profitability of A, and that of the bundle, β.
This is significant because, unlike prevailing definitions of the
attribution test, this ensures proper adjustments for changes in cost
that result from scope economies or joint costs.
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Appendix iii: Improving the attribution test
The two prevailing accounts of the attribution test are mathematically
identical (see appendix i) when there are no joint costs. However,
the prevailing accounts produce incorrect conclusions in situations
involving scope economies, or joint costs.
Recall the following scenario, which is given in the text:
Colds are treated with medicines Alpha for congestion and
Beta for coughs. Firm 1 has a dominant position in medicine
Alpha which costs $5 to manufacture. The process of
inserting Alpha into a capsule and packaging it
("encapsulating") costs $4. Firm 1 sells encapsulated Alpha
for $12, 3$ above its costs. Firm 1 also has a less substantial
position in a multi-firm market for Beta. Its Beta
manufacturing costs are $3 and it sells encapsulated Beta for
$8, which includes a $1 markup. Finally, the firm offers an
Alpha/Beta combination for $16. Because it costs no more to
encapsulate two drugs than to encapsulate one, it earns
exactly the same markup as it would earn on separate sales,
but incurs the encapsulating costs only once.
As discussed in the text, this strategy ought to be granted safe
harbor because it cannot exclude a rival who is equally efficient and
observes the same joint cost savings.
We can then apply the two prevailing (and equivalent)
accounts of the attribution test, showing that both draw inappropriate
conclusions. We will let A and B denote encapsulated alpha and
beta respectively. β will denote the bundled encapsulation of alpha
and beta.
From appendix i, account 1 can be given as:

In our case P(B) = 8, d = 4, and MC(B) = 7. Hence, the bundle fails
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the attribution test, account 1.
As shown in appendix i, account 2 can be given as:

In our case P(β) = 16, P(A) = 12, and MC(B) = 7. Hence, the bundle
fails the attribution test, account 2.
The problem with these tests is that they do not properly
account for differences in the marginal costs faced by firms. To be
sure, the marginal cost of producing B is less than the marginal cost of
adding B to an already encapsulated A, as the latter does not include
the joint cost that must be faced by the former. However, this
difference is ignored by the prevailing versions of the attribution test.
Now consider the alternative test we offer in the text:
To prove that a bundled discount was exclusionary or
predatory the plaintiff must establish that the incremental price
of the bundle (that is, the difference between the defendant’s
standalone price of A and its price of A + B) is less than the
incremental cost that the seller incurs when adding the B good
to the bundle
Explicitly, this can be given as:

In our case, P(β) = 16, P(A) = 12, MC(β) = 12, and MC(A) = 9. Hence,
the bundle passes the attribution test. Unlike the previous accounts of
the attribution test, this new test effectively provides safe harbor.
To simplify, this test can be given in terms of marginal or per-unit
profitability, as they were defined earlier:
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This new version of the attribution test works equally well in
situations that do not involve scope economies or joint costs.

Appendix iv: Earning profits through bundling
Case 1: Profits resulting from exclusion
If a bundling strategy observes reduced profits in the short run, it
must observe long run recoupment in order to be profitable. This
situation is analogous to standard cases of price predation. The
baseline here, however, is not cost, but the profits earned before
bundling. After all, no pricing decision is prima facie rational unless it
raises total profits above their previous levels.

In this example, the firm begins by offering only the monopoly good.
At T1, the firm begins offering a bundle that fails the attribution test.
Clearly, any increased sales that result do not outweigh the reduced
profitability of the bundle, as the firm observes reduced profits.
However, rivals are foreclosed at time T2. At this time, the firm can
begin charging artificially high prices. Hence profit per quarter rises
well above the level observed before bundling. As new rivals begin
entering the market, profit per quarter begins to decline. At T3, the
monopolist faces profits similar to those observed before bundling,
indicating it still has some price setting power over the secondary
good (or that it simply stopped selling bundles).
In order for an exclusion-dependent strategy to be rational, a firm
must believe that the increased profits observed from T2 to T3
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outweigh the reduced profits observed from T1 to T2.

Case 2: Profits resulting from price discrimination
If a bundling strategy is profitable purely as a method of price
discrimination, its payoff is observed immediately. There is no need
for long run recoupment. Rather, the discount and the recoupment
occur simultaneously.

Again, the firm begins offering the bundle at T1. Because it attracts
so many new customers, the increased output outweighs the
reduced margin. The increased profits are observed immediately,
and remain consistent throughout. In this case, the profitability of the
bundling strategy is not dependent on the foreclosure. However, this
does not mean rivals cannot be foreclosed. What is important is that
the firm in question would pursue this strategy whether or not it is
likely to result in exclusion.

